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THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY

THE INSURGENT GOVERNMENT OF 1898

TOGETHER WITH

OPINIONS ON THE QUESTION:

ARE THE FILIPINOS CAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT?

FIRST SERIES

III.

January 10, 1901.

This pamphlet may be obtained
by application to L. K. Fuller,
12 Otis Place, Boston, Mass.

THE Philippine Information Society is preparing a series of publications in pursuance of the purpose for which the Society was formed, that namely of placing within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them.

The whole of the evidence, even the whole of the official evidence, is more voluminous than a busy people can be expected to read. Some selection on our part has, therefore, been a necessary condition of the accomplishing of our object. This selection by us, has, however, been confined so far as possible, to the choosing of subjects to be dealt with. Upon each subject chosen we have given in some cases all the evidence obtainable, in all other cases as much of the evidence as the setting of reasonable limits to the length of these publications would permit, and ample references to the remainder. In these cases we have endeavored to include the evidence that is most authoritative and important.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory, or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story, will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, or of any appearance of unfairness in the presentation of evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The subject of the present series of papers has seemed to us as important as any that could be selected. It comprises the principal episodes in the history of our relation to the Filipinos, chiefly as that history is contained in our state papers. We have been careful to include the evidence which tells of the Filipinos' share in that history, as well as our own. Whatever view one may hold as to the proper policy for us to pursue toward the Filipinos, it is evident that no policy can be intelligently chosen nor successfully carried out unless it is based upon an understanding of these people, and of their present attitude toward us, and toward the question of our relation to them. It is hoped that the account we shall offer of the development of that attitude may prove a help toward such an understanding.

Worcester
Philippine Coll.

THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

OUTLINE OF FIRST SERIES.

THE STORY OF THE FILIPINOS 110. 3

AS TOLD IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

I. José Rizal, the Filipino Patriot: together with an account of the Insurgent Movement of 1896.

II. Aguinaldo: a Selection from his Official Documents, together with the Authorized Accounts of the alleged "Spanish Bribe."

III. The Insurgent Government of 1898.

IV. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898.

V. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899.

VI. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Incidents leading up to the Outbreak of Hostilities.

VII. Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, and Efforts to secure an Armistice.

VIII. Efforts at Recognition, October and November, 1899.

IX. Present Condition and Attitude.

NOTE. It will be impossible to bring out the circulars in their chronological order owing to the difficulty and delay in securing certain of the necessary official documents, some of which, indeed, are not yet in our hands. Every effort will be made, however, consistent with thoroughness and accuracy to issue them as soon as possible.

PART I.

THE INSURGENT GOVERNMENT OF 1898.

Although among the many vexed questions relating to the Philippines, none has been more discussed than the capacity of the natives for self-government, yet, for lack of available evidence, none has been so completely a matter of conjecture and *a priori* reasoning. Obviously the most valuable evidence would relate to what has been accomplished already by these people in the way of self-government. While it has been generally understood that Aguinaldo did set up some form of government early in 1898, authentic information as to its nature, success, and duration has been peculiarly hard to get. It is felt, therefore, that no apology is needed for setting before the public the accounts of this government to be found in the published documents of the United States, and in the recitals of various United States officials. A summary of the events which the evidence tends to show is substantially as follows:—

Aguinaldo, immediately after his return to the Philippines, in May, 1898, issued a proclamation calling upon the Filipinos to rally about him, and stating that he proposed, as soon as possible, to set up a temporary dictatorial government, which should be in force until a regular constitutional government could be organized. (See Appendix A.) This dictatorial government was established by proclamation, June 18, 1898. (See Senate Document 62, page 432.) He immediately proceeded to make good his promises for a representative government by sending out, on the 20th, instructions for the holding of elections (see Senate Document 62, page 433), and on the 23d, established by proclamation the "Revolutionary Government" with regular executive, legislative, and judicial departments. (See Senate Document 62, pages 432-437, quoted in Pamphlet II., page 18, of this series.) This government was in force during the period after the overthrow of the Spanish rule and before the Americans definitely assumed the sovereignty of the Islands; in other words, when the Filipinos were in a condition more free from outside influences than at any time for centuries. In August, it asked for recognition from other governments (see Senate Document 62, page 438) but in vain. On January 23, 1899, the election of delegates having been completed, the Constitution of the Filipino Republic was adopted, and General Otis was requested to inform the Government at Washington accordingly. (See page 33, below.) The subsequent history of the Insurgent Government falls outside the scope of this pamphlet.

Two chief questions to be asked with regard to this government are: (1) Was it effective in maintaining law and order? (2) Was it popular with the people? For the answers to these questions, readers are referred to the quotations below.

ACCOUNTS OF EYE WITNESSES.

Among the few Americans who had an opportunity to observe conditions while the Filipino government was in force, in provinces remote from Manila, first place must be given to Cadet Leonard R. Sargent and Paymaster W. B. Wilcox of the United States Navy, who, under the authority of Admiral Dewey, spent the greater part of October and November, 1898, in travelling through the central and northern portions of the island of Luzon, covering more than six hundred miles. Nov. 23, 1898, in obedience to an order from Admiral Dewey (see Senate Document 66, 56th Congress, 1st Session, page 24), they submitted a report of their tour of observation. This report was forwarded to Washington, by Admiral Dewey, Dec. 1, 1898, with the following indorsement: —

[SENATE DOCUMENT 66, PAGE 44.]

“(Indorsement.)

“ FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA,
“ CAVITE, P. I., December 1, 1898.

“Approved and respectfully forwarded for the information of the Navy Department.

“Especial attention is invited to this interesting and carefully prepared report, which, in my opinion, contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon Island.

“ GEORGE DEWEY, Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
“Commanding Asiatic Station.”

This report, together with reprints of articles prepared by its authors and originally published in the “Outlook” for Sept. 2 and 23, 1899, and the “Independent,” for Sept. 14, 1899, is printed in Senate Document 66, 56th Congress, 1st Session, from which the following quotations are taken. The whole document is of exceptional value. Readers are strongly urged to obtain it by applying to their respective senators, and from it to supply for themselves the omissions which, to the great regret of the editors, lack of space in the present pamphlet makes imperative. The editors believe that any one who does so supplement these quotations will realize that the omissions do not affect the estimate given. This estimate, being for the most part favorable, we have, in especial, been careful to include everything of an unfavorable or qualifying tendency.

TESTIMONY OF W. B. WILCOX, U. S. N., AND L. R. SARGENT, U. S. N

[SENATE DOCUMENT 66, PAGES 1-3.]

(*From L. R. Sargent's article in the "Outlook," Sept. 2, 1899.*)

"It will be remembered that at that date [October and November, 1898], the United States had not yet announced its policy with regard to the Philippines. The terms of the treaty with Spain were being negotiated by our Commissioners in Paris, and the fate of the islands hung in the balance. In the meantime the native population, taking matters in their own hands, had declared their independence from all foreign jurisdiction and had set up a provisional government with Aguinaldo at its head.

"Although this government has never been recognized, and in all probability will go out of existence without recognition, yet it cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone between anarchy and order. The military forces of the United States held control only in Manila, with its environs, and in Cavite, and had no authority to proceed further; while in the vast remaining districts the representatives of the only recognized power on the field were prisoners in the hands of their despised subjects. It was the opinion at Manila during this anomalous period in our Philippine relations, and possibly in the United States as well, that such a state of affairs must breed something akin to anarchy.

"I can state unreservedly, however, that Mr. Wilcox and I found the existing conditions to be much at variance with this opinion. During our absence from Manila we travelled more than 600 miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces, of which some were under the immediate control of the central government at Malolos, while others were remotely situated, separated from each other and from the seat of government by natural divisions of land, and accessible only by lengthy and arduous travel. As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new régime.

"Some years ago, at an exposition held at Barcelona, Spain, a man and woman were exhibited as representative types of the inhabitants of Luzon. The man wore a loin cloth and the woman a scanty skirt. It was evident that they belonged to the lowest plane of savagery. I think no deeper wound was ever inflicted upon the pride of

the real Filipino population than that caused by this exhibition, the knowledge of which seems to have spread throughout the island. The man and woman, while actually natives of Luzon, were captives from a tribe of wild Igorrotes of the hills, a tribe as hostile to the Filipinos as to the Spaniards themselves, and equally alien to both. It is doubtful to what extent such islanders are responsible for the low esteem in which the Filipino is held; his achievements certainly have never been well advertised, while his shortcomings have been heralded abroad. The actual, every-day Filipino is not as picturesque a creature as the Igorrote. The average human imagination has a remarkable affinity for the picturesque, and the commonplace citizen of Luzon is too often overlooked in the presence of the engrossing savage. If the observer's attention can be drawn to the former, however, much that is of interest will be found in his comparatively homely life.

"In our journey we travelled first across the province of Nueva Icija, by far the poorest and least interesting of all the provinces we visited. And yet, even here, we were greatly surprised by the intelligence and refinement of the inhabitants. While our entertainment at first was meagre,—for want of the wherewithal to provide a more generous one,—we could nevertheless detect the same spirit of hospitality that found vent in elaborate manifestations in the richer towns which we visited later. We were particularly struck by the dignified demeanor of our hosts, and by the graceful manner in which they extended to us their welcome. We had unlimited opportunities for conversation with the citizens of towns, and we found everywhere a class that gave evidence of considerable culture and a certain amount of education. Their education included those branches only which were taught at the schools conducted by the priesthood at the capital towns of the provinces, and was of rather an impracticable nature. The Spanish language, Spanish history (appropriately garbed), church history and the dead languages, evidently formed its leading features.

"The natives of this class seemed to have made the most of opportunities offered them, and they had the subjects above mentioned completely at command. This enabled them to give a trend to their conversation that served at least to indicate their aspirations. On the other hand, their ignorance of modern history and politics, and particularly of current events, was astonishing. What they knew of the United States had been learned like the Latin, from Spanish teachers, but was not equally reliable. Not only in the backward province of Nueva Icija, but elsewhere throughout our journey, we found the same fund of misinformation on the subject. This related in great measure to the attitude of our Government toward the two races of people that have come under its jurisdiction with an inferior political status, namely, the Indians and the negroes. Of the condition of th

negroes since the war, the Filipinos seem not to be aware. They express great curiosity on the subject of the Indian question, and have evidently been taught to see in the unhappy condition of that race, the result of deliberate oppression, and a warning of what they may expect from our Government if they submit themselves to its legislation. Of ourselves,—the citizens of the United States,—they have been told that we possess neither patriotism, honor, religion, nor any other restraining or refining influence. A character has been given us consistent with the acts attributed to our nation. The natives are now undoubtedly becoming enlightened as to our true character, but it will probably be a long time before their last suspicions are removed. In the meanwhile, we cannot but hope that the good faith of our government in any proposition it may make to the Filipino people will be accepted in advance. When it becomes a question of our fairness and our honest intentions toward them, the burden of the proof must rest on us."

[PAGE 8.]

"The dangers incident to travel have had much to do with the confusion of dialects that prevails on the island, and this confusion is consequently more marked in the eastern than in the western provinces. The educated class of Filipinos can speak two languages that are universal throughout the island in their own class; these are Spanish and Tagalog. The ignorant natives, on the other hand, have only their own provincial dialect. These dialects are so different one from another that they must be separately studied to be understood. Dictionaries of many of them have been made by the Jesuit priests. Through the servants of our party, we had at command five dialects in addition to the Spanish and Tagalog, yet in passing through one province we failed utterly to make ourselves understood by a native whom we accosted, although we plied him patiently with these seven languages.

"There is but one individual who seems never to be daunted by the obstacles and dangers that separate him from the provinces toward which he sees fit to direct his footsteps. I refer to the Chinaman. In almost every village we visited we found at least one of that race, and in the larger towns there were many. They are the merchants of the island, presiding over every shop, and drawing money from every village. They are deeply hated by the Filipinos, and were the object of a strict immigration law under the administration of Aguinaldo's provisional government."

[PAGE 10.]

"Freedom of thought marked the views of every Filipino that I have heard express himself on the subject of religion, and although I certainly have met devout Catholics among them, I judge that that

church, on account of the abuses with which it has been associated on the island, has failed on the whole to secure an exclusive hold on the minds of the natives. In speaking of the Filipino people I have had reference throughout principally to one class of their society, which I have called the cultured class. If my observations of that class are just, however, I think that inferences can be safely drawn from them that extend their application over the entire Tagalog population. The great mass of this population has been kept in an unenlightened state by deliberate legislation, which has effectually deprived them of every possible opportunity for advancement. Those who have acquired education have acquired it at an extravagant cost that has placed it hopelessly beyond the reach of all but the wealthy. There are few, if any, among the number, however, who, while possessing the price of a schooling, have neglected to apply it to that end. I cannot see what better gauge we can obtain at present of the intelligence and ambition of the whole Filipino race than the progress that has been made by its favored members with the limited opportunities at their command. Throughout the islands the thirst for knowledge is manifested, and an extravagant respect for those who possess it.

"I have seen a private native citizen in a town in the interior exercise a more powerful influence than all the native officials over the minds of the inhabitants, simply because he was known to have been educated in the best schools at Manila, and was regarded for that reason as a superior man. The heroes of these people are not heroes of war, but of science and invention. Without rival, the American who is best known by reputation in Luzon is Mr. Edison, and any native with the slightest pretension to education whom you may question on the subject will take delight in reciting a list of his achievements. The ruling Filipinos, during the existence of their provincial government, appreciated the necessity of providing public schools to be accessible to the poorest inhabitants. Had events so shaped themselves as to have provided an opportunity for carrying into effect the plans formed on this point, it seems possible that the mental plane of the entire population might have been raised gradually to a surprising height.

"Out of respect to the statements of other people which the narrative of my experience may seem to contradict, I wish to say that I have found the native of the interior of Luzon an astonishingly different character from the one ordinarily met in Manila. Previous to my journey, I regarded those whom I had encountered in that city with great dislike, and after my return I was unable to overcome that feeling. They are not a fair sample of the race, and I cannot expect any one who has formed his judgment on the subject merely from observations of that type to express an opinion similar to mine, as recorded above."

[PAGES 11-14.]

(*From L. R. Sargent's article in the "Outlook," Sept. 23, 1899.*)

"The provisional government which assumed control of Filipino affairs in Luzon Island after the downfall of the Spanish power was a military one. The president of the so-called republic was general of the army and had at his command all the forces of the state, while military officers filled the high positions throughout the provinces. It was continually asserted by those in power that this disposition of the control of affairs had been resorted to merely to tide over the existing emergency and that it should continue only until the establishment of a permanent peace. As long as it remained in force, however, the concentration of power was absolute, and, moreover, no change of government could be contemplated without the co-operation of the controlling class. In the event of peace the population hoped to see the reins of the government placed in their hands, but if opposition were offered they certainly had not the power to seize them. The military class controlled the situation, and with it, in great measure, the destiny of the people. Accordingly as they were actuated by motives of patriotism or of personal ambition they could, if unmolested, inaugurate a just and liberal government or they could set upon the galled shoulders of their race a yoke as cruel as that they had just cast off.

"It will never be known how they would have stood this crucial test. The peace they had anticipated is further from them now than ever, and it has been decreed to a stronger power to relieve them of the responsibility of the vital decision. Yet they have not been deprived of importance. They still retain the official voice of their people, and it is with them that our nation is now at war. In view of their pre-eminent position in Luzon affairs, past, present, and future, some interest must attach to every observation of their character, especially to such as tend to show to what extent they represent the feelings and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino population, and in what measure they have at heart the truest interests of their race.

"The leaders of the military element have been drawn, almost without exception, from the younger generation of that enlightened class of Filipinos of which I have spoken in a previous article as existing everywhere throughout Luzon Island. They possess, of course, many qualities in common with their older kinsfolk, in whose charge they have been reared; and yet they differ from them so significantly on many points as to deserve particular attention. The characters of men are not set to such rigid lines as to remain unchanged by the sudden attainment of authority, and the Filipino, like his

brother of every other land, assumes a new demeanor with his uniform of office.

"Throughout the period of my association with both classes, I found the distinction apparent between civilians and military officers. Had Mr. Wilcox and I been provided for our journey with the customary credentials required of travellers in that country, many of the evidences of this difference which came to our notice would have been missing. Starting without passports, however (in fact, after having been refused them by Aguinaldo), our status was such as to invite all possible arrogance on the part of the officials, while throwing the most favorable light on the hospitality of the natives. Under the circumstances, I am inclined to think that there was a surprising lack of arrogance in the attitude which the officials assumed toward us. Yet there was a dignity in their bearing, and in some cases a coldness, caused by their suspicions of the motive of our journey, which were entirely lacking in their civilian countrymen. 'Armor is heavy, but it is a proud burden, and a man standeth straight in it.' So these young Filipinos, vested with the authority of their office and supporting the responsibility of their duty toward the state, assumed a manlier and more independent bearing than the genial and conciliatory one of the older men.

"In the opposition which they frequently offered to our plans we found much that was inconvenient, but nothing that was unreasonable from their point of view. We found them hard to cajole or to 'bluff,' or to move by any means other than a fair and open statement which they could clearly understand. Before the end of the journey, we came to regard the military Filipino as the only stumbling-block to our progress. And yet, in spite of the annoyance he caused us and of the frequent changes in our itinerary induced by his persistent opposition, we learned to admire him far beyond his simpler and more amiable countrymen.

"It could easily be seen that we did not control a monopoly of the admiration expended on this subject. The older men looked with manifest pride on the evidence of the firm purpose and quick decision of their sons and nephews, even while endeavoring, in many instances, to mollify the rigor of their methods; and the young officers themselves evinced great complacency when they dwelt upon the subject of their past achievements in the field and of the efficiency of their subsequent administration of affairs. The experience through which they had passed had imparted to their character a respect for their own ability and confidence in their own resources that is woefully lacking in the untried Filipino.

"Prior to my departure from Manila I had witnessed many examples of this deficiency in the national character, and had considered

them of considerable significance. I remember on one occasion having observed a native coachman, whose carriage had been overturned by a collision, standing helplessly in the road regarding the wreck with an expression of utter despair, while he wrung his hands together and repeated in tones of the most agonized self-pity the expression, 'Pobre Filipino! Pobre Filipino!' He was still in this attitude when an American soldier near by took the matter in hand, and in a very short time had the horse on his feet, the carriage right side up, and the harness readjusted. I thought at the time that if the Filipino race possessed no more stamina than that displayed by this coachman and no more readiness and resource to assist them in confronting unforeseen situations they would be indeed fortunate to have always at hand the ready support of a stronger power.

"I was not aware of the hardening effect upon the national character of the events even then occurring, and did not guess that the identical qualities whose absence I had noticed were being rapidly inculcated by the first phases of that experience to whose success I had considered their presence indispensable.

"Other qualities than these, moreover, are awakening from a dormant state. Prior to the advent of the great incentive of his life that came with the revolution, the native displayed in all his undertakings but little endurance and less perseverance. His existence was so ordered that no permanent good could come to him or his family from even the most continued endeavor, and he labored, therefore, for some temporary emolument only. He never had at stake a prize really worth the winning, and there was nothing within his horizon that appealed to him as deserving of as much attention as his own physical comfort.

"It was this that he considered first when set to any task, and he refused always to work under a strain. He recognized the limit to his powers within which he could work at ease, and, if forced beyond this limit, he promptly 'threw up the sponge.' In our party, at one time, among the number of our packmen were several old natives whom we had picked up at a little inland town. They belonged to the 'ante bellum' type of Filipino, and seemed scarcely cognizant of recent events. One day, toward nightfall, noticing that one of these packmen was missing, we sent back over the trail to ascertain what had become of him. He was found about five miles in the rear, resting by the roadside, the picture of ease and indifference. In answer to our indignant inquiries, he merely replied that he had felt tired and stopped to rest. When ordered to proceed, and threatened with punishment if he loitered, he made the distance to camp in good time. It was not a case of exhaustion, of physical inability, but merely of an inconvenient weariness and entire absence of grit. Such was the old,

purposeless, unawakened Filipino, and he bears a marked contrast to the vigorous and enthusiastic young insurgent soldier, whose every energy is at the service of the cause he has espoused, and who has endured every hardship and braved every danger in its support.

" We heard many tales, and were in a position to authenticate them to a great extent, of deeds that told in glowing terms of the endurance and courage the Filipinos could display when impelled by a sufficient motive. The revolution in Luzon Island was by no means a simultaneous uprising of the population, and in its early stages the force that opposed the Spanish power was not overwhelming in its numbers. In the provinces far in the interior, particular'y, the earlier encounters found the advantage in the hands of the Spaniards, whose opponents were but small bands of the most daring and desperate natives of the vicinity, poorly armed and entirely without organization or discipline. Yet these pioneers of rebellion did win brilliant and surprising victories, and, by their success, encouraged their more timid neighbors to join their fortunes to the cause.

" In a district embracing the capital city of Nuroa Vizcaya, a band of twenty Filipinos were for several days the only natives in open rebellion, and they conducted hostilities unaided against a force of Spaniards ten times their number. The Spanish commander, alarmed at the signs of discontent among the population, undertook to proceed with his troops to a neighboring town possessed of stronger defences. He was ambushed three separate times on the march by the little band of rebels, and suffered a large loss. Reports immediately swelled the ranks of the insurgents, and before the week was out the entire province was in their hands. The leader of the gallant little band of patriots, Lieutenant Navarro, is one of the very few officers whom I have met who represent the more ignorant class of the population. He could not speak Spanish, nor read nor write his own language, and on that account, at the time of our visit, had not risen above the rank of lieutenant.

" In many of the provinces the revolution received its start from detachments of Aguinaldo's expeditionary forces, which were sent across the island from the more populous districts on the western coast. These detachments — in some cases mere squads — performed remarkable service."

[PAGES 15, 16.]

" At the time of our journey the patriotic enthusiasm of the population was everywhere at its height. The boast of every inhabitant was the national army whose organization was then being rapidly perfected. Commissions were eagerly sought by the young men of the higher class, and there were more volunteers for service in the ranks than could be armed or uniformed.

"It was universally asserted that every preparation should be made to defend the newly-won independence of the island against all foreign aggression. The older Filipinos, especially those of wealth and influence, declared their desire to give every support in their power to the cause, and were as much a part of the warlike movement as those who actually took up arms. The great majority of the latter, both officers and enlisted men, were extremely young. I have met a brigadier-general of 21 years of age, many captains of 18, and lieutenants of 15 and 16. Captain Natioidad, a particularly young officer of that rank and a member of a prominent Luzon family, explained that it was the aim of his government to rest its defence in the field in the hands of those of its supporters who were at that age that is most forcibly swayed by the love of military glory. For the desperate encounters that might await its army in the future, it desired that sort of valor of which discretion is not the better part.

"That the civil power should be placed in the same hands was a dangerous experiment, but at the same time a necessary one. The first object of the Filipinos had been to win their independence: the next to defend it. For both these purposes they had need of their best fighting material, and the selection was made accordingly. The result proved more fortunate than they had any reason to hope. While exercising absolute authority throughout the island and governing entirely by military law, the leaders of the army appeared, nevertheless, to endeavor to mete out justice to all classes alike. They continued, moreover, to assert their intention to relinquish their temporary power when the establishment of a permanent peace should make such a step possible, and gave most encouraging proofs of the good faith with which they spoke.

"A tendency was apparent in many individual instances to treat the entire civilian population with contempt, and the lower element of it with oppression and abuse. In one or two districts through which we passed this spirit was particularly marked, but it was not countenanced as a rule, and had been made the subject of special order from the authorities at Malolos. On the whole, as far as I could judge, the tendency was upward. The young officers displayed an earnest desire to improve their minds for the benefit of the state, and seemed to be impelled by the ambition to prove themselves worthy of the trust that had been confided in them.

"I passed one evening, about the middle of November, in the '*Comandancia*' at San Fernando, in the province of Union, where were quartered over forty officers belonging either to companies stationed at the town or to the staff of General Fina, the commander of the northwestern district. Our conversation was confined, as usual, to a great extent, to professional subjects: but I remember the visit

particularly on account of the presence of a number of Spanish textbooks on infantry tactics, which were distributed among the officers and were evidently in almost constant service. * * * * [Stars are as given in the Senate Document.] How many of these eager young students of the rudiments of military science have since learned their final lesson of war?"

[PAGE 23.]

(From L. R. Sargent's article in the "Independent," Sept. 14, 1899.)

"We wished to see the interior provinces on this side of the island, but were prevented by the authorities. Already the hope was fading that freedom from Spain meant freedom for government. The feeling toward Americans was changing, and we saw its effect in the colder manner of the people and in their evident desire to hustle us along by the most direct road to Manila.

"Although the spirit was evidently missing, we were nominally treated with every distinction. A mounted escort was furnished us, which rode ahead with guidons to clear the road. The towns in these western coast provinces are larger and more numerous than those in the valley of the Rio Grande. The military element is much more in evidence, as well as the native religious element which has succeeded the Spanish priests."*

"In the latter part of November Paymaster Wilcox and I returned to Manila. A few minutes after our arrival I attempted to engage the services of a Filipino coachman, and found him sullen and insolent almost beyond belief. I thought of the courteous gentleman and respectful servant I had met in the interior, and wondered where among them I should class this brute. Yet they are all three one; and together they make up the Filipino. Good treatment makes of him the respectful servant, education makes of him a gentleman that no man need be ashamed to greet; but anything that he interprets as injustice arouses something in his nature that makes of him a stubborn and intractable brute. If all were known about the Filipino, public sentiment about him, while it might not be changed, would at least be softened. There are qualities in him too fine to be wantonly destroyed. If the brute must be broken, let us hope that the respectful servant and the gentleman will be encouraged."

[PAGE 27.]

(From "Official Report of Tour through Island of Luzon.")

"11. In the villages of Humingan and Lupao there are a few Spanish prisoners,—priests, soldiers, and civil officials. We have seen representatives of each of these three classes in these towns. We could detect no signs of previous ill treatment nor of undue restric-

[* Omissions : Youth of the officers.]

tion. On the contrary, they appeared to possess the freedom of the town in which they lived.

"12. The towns in this section are neither large nor important. Huminan, the largest, has not over two or three thousand inhabitants. The church, with the convent attached, is the largest building in each town; it is built of planed wood, whitewashed. There are three or four houses of planed wood in each town, the rest of the village consisting of grass huts. The *presidente locale* and other local officers are native Filipinos. Most of them have received a certain amount of education at religious schools in Manila. They are intelligent men and extremely eager to learn news from the outside world. Their knowledge of modern history and geography, however, is extremely limited, and their ignorance of current events is surprising. We brought them their first definite information with regard to Cuba, and to their own present status. One or two of them had heard of the Congress at Paris, but no one had any ideas as to its object, nor as to its relation to themselves. They were well grounded on only three points,—the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor, the surrender of Manila, and the declaration of the Philippine Government at Malolos of the independence of the islands and the establishment of a republican form of government, with Señor Aguinaldo as president. Even on these points the details they had received were very inaccurate."

[PAGE 35.]

"37. There are many Spanish prisoners in this town — civil, office, priests, soldiers. Eighty-four priests were paraded in the street for our inspection. The greater number of them were dressed in civilian garb, only four or five of them wearing the robes of their office. Nearly all of them wore long hair and beards. They appeared in good health, and we could detect no evidence of maltreatment. These priests had been assembled from different parts of the province. They are kept under stricter guard than either of the other two classes of prisoners, for the reason that the native officials fear that if permitted to go among the people they will use the influence they possess through their position in the church to incite them against the Philippine government. We also met Don José Perez, a Spaniard who had previously been governor of the island. He was well-dressed and appeared to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts."

[PAGES 36, 37.]

"42. The steamer 'Saturnas,' which had left the harbor the day before our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the senators from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the

independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel Tirona considered the information of sufficient reliability to justify him in regarding the Philippine independence as assured and warfare in the island at an end. For this reason he proceeded to relinquish the military command he held over the provinces and to place this power in the hands of a civil officer elected by the people. On the day following our arrival in Aparri the ceremony occurred which solemnized this transfer of authority in the province of Cagayan. The *presidentes locales* of all the towns in the province were present at the ceremony conducted by a native priest. After the priest had retired Colonel Tirona made a short speech, stating that, since in all probability permanent peace was at hand, it became his duty to relinquish the authority he had previously held over the province and to place it in the hands of a civil officer elected by the people. He then handed the staff of office to a man who had been elected '*jefe-provincial.*' This officer also made a speech, in which he thanked the disciplined military forces and their colonel for the service they had rendered the province, and assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated by the people of the province, where every man, woman, and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly-won liberty, and to resist with the last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever to bring them back to their former state of dependence. His speech was very impassioned. He then knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and took the oath of office. He was followed by the three other officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of the three departments,—justice, police, and internal revenue. Every town in this province has this same organization. At the time of our departure Colonel Tirona planned to go within a few days to Ilagan and from there to Bayombong, repeating the ceremony in the capital of each province.

"43. We were hospitably entertained at the Aparri; two balls were given in our honor. The town has a population of 20,000 inhabitants. It has many handsome houses and several well-defined streets. The military force stationed here consists of 300 soldiers, in addition to which the harbor has the protection of the gun boat '*Philippina*,' which carries two guns of a calibre of about three inches. There are several officers here, three captains, and five or six lieutenants. The colonel goes from town to town in his district, and Commandante Leyba spends part of his time at Tuguegarno. There are no Spaniards here, with the exception of two or three merchants: one of these representing the company of the steamer '*Saturnas*,' we have met. He is pursuing his business entirely unmolested."

[PAGE 38.]

“46. We remained at Vigan all next day, November 12. It had rained during the night, rendering impassable a part of the road to the next town. We walked through the town and visited the houses of several tradespeople. At one of these houses we heard the first and only definite complaint which came to our ears during the entire journey on the part of the natives against the present government. These people complained of the taxes imposed upon them, and even went so far as to say that they preferred the Spanish government. This statement was made in the presence of a party of six natives, and was acquiesced in by all; they were all, however, of the same family.”

[PAGES 41-44.]

“52. The foregoing narrative of our journey is designed to give a general description of the country we passed through and of the methods of travel, and to illustrate by its incidents the character and grades of intelligence of its people and their attitude toward Americans, especially toward ourselves as military officers. The information we have acquired on certain points is summed up in the following paragraphs :—

“INTELLIGENCE AND EDUCATION OF THE NATIVES.

“53. The Philippine officers, both military and civil, that we have met in all the provinces we have visited, have, with very few exceptions, been men of intelligent appearance and conversation. The same is true of all those men who form the upper class in each town. The education of most of them is limited, but they appear to seize every opportunity to improve it. They have great respect and admiration for learning. Very many of them desire to send their children to schools in the United States or Europe. Many men of importance in different towns have told us that the first use to be made of the revenues of their government, after there is no more danger of war, will be to start good schools in every village. The poorer classes are extremely ignorant on most subjects, but a large percentage of them can read and write.

“RELATION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR.

“54. There is a very marked line between these two classes, and this has been broadened by the insurrection for the reason that military officers must equip themselves without pay, and that civil officers have numerous expenses for which they receive no return. All officers, civil and military, have therefore been chosen from the richer class; and the political and military power of the provinces is in the

hands of that class. The private soldiers are fed and clothed by the government and allowed a very small amount of spending money — in the western provinces, thirty cents in silver per week.

"ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY TOWARD THE CIVIL CLASS."

"55. In the provinces of the East that we have visited, there appears to be little or no friction between the civil and military classes. Officers and privates, as far as we could observe, treat civilians with consideration. In the provinces of Ilocos, Sur, and Union there is a marked difference. The officers are more domineering. In travelling in these provinces we had many opportunities to observe this attitude. When accidents happened to our carriage, the officer commanding our escort called to our assistance every native in sight. When they did not answer to his call promptly we have seen him strike them with his riding whip. One man had a serious wound on his face where an officer had struck him with his pistol butt. He came to us for redress, after having appealed in vain to the military officer in command of the town. An order from Don Emilio Aguinaldo, dated October 18, 1898, calls the attention of his officers to the evils of this practice, and orders them to correct it in themselves and instruct all sergeants, corporals, and privates on the attitude that they should maintain towards civilians.

"DOMINION OF THE CHURCH."

"56. In the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabella, and Cagayan, the native priests have no voice whatever in civil matters.

"The Catholic Church itself seems to have very little hold on the people of these provinces. Many men have expressed to us their preference for the Protestant Church. In Ilocos, Sur, and Union there are many more priests than in the other provinces mentioned. Every pueblo and barrio has its cura, and there are higher officers of the church in the larger towns. They appear to have an important influence in all civil matters.

"POPULAR SENTIMENT REGARDING INDEPENDENCE."

"57. Of the large number of officers, civil and military, and of the leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has expressed in our presence his sentiment on this question. It is universally the same. They all declare that they will accept nothing short of independence. They desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear any interference on land. The question of the remuneration of our government for the expense of establishing a protectorate is never touched upon. On the subject of independence there is, again, a marked difference between the four provinces first visited and those

of Ilocos, Sur, and Union. In the former there is more enthusiasm.—the sentiment is more of the people; in the latter, is more of the higher class and of the army. In these provinces we have seen signs of actual discontent with the existing state of things.

“ ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES.

“ 58. There is much variety of feeling among the Philippines with regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United States. In every town we found men who said that our nation had saved them from slavery, and others who claimed that without our interference their independence would have been recognized before this time. On one point they are united, however, viz., that whatever our Government may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex them. They have been prejudiced against us by the Spaniards. The charges made have been so numerous and so severe that what the natives have since learned has not sufficed to disillusion them. With regard to the record of our policy toward a subject people, they have received remarkable information on two points,—that we have mercilessly slain and finally exterminated the race of Indians that were natives of our soil, and that we went to war in 1861 to suppress an insurrection of negro slaves, whom we also ended by exterminating. Intelligent and well-informed men have believed these charges. They were rehearsed to us in many towns in different provinces, beginning at Malolos. The Spanish version of our Indian problem is particularly well known.

“ PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR.

“ 59. The Philippine government has an organized military force in every province we have visited. They claim it extends also in Ilocos Norte, Abra, Lepanto, Bontoc, and Benguet. With regard to its existence in Ilocos and Benguet we can speak with assurance. We have met two officers with the rank of captain who are regularly stationed at Laoag, the capital city of Ilocos Norte, and also the *comandante* of the province of Benguet. The latter officer had come to San Fernando to obtain instructions from General Tino, and was about to return to Trinidad, the capital of that province. The number of troops under arms can only be given approximately. There are comparatively few in Nueva Icija; an estimate number of not over 300. In the military district embracing the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabell, and Cagayan, Colonel Tirona, Commandante Leyba, and Commandante Villa agreed in giving the number of soldiers under arms actually as 2000. An estimate, founded on the size of the garrisons in the towns we visited would bring the number nearly up to that figure. In the western military districts the number of forces is about double that number, leaving out those stationed in the

interior provinces of Abra, Lepanto, Bontoc, and Benguet, of which we know nothing positively. In the coast provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, and Union, a conservative estimate of the forces is 3500. In most of the pueblos the garrison is but little larger than those in the towns of the western districts ; but there are many *barrios*, each one of which has its guard of soldiers, never less than 12. In the eastern military district we met not more than 25 officers, and in the western district over 60. There are rifles enough for all, principally Remingtons, but many Mausers. In every *cuartek* there are at least as many rifles as there are soldiers in the garrison. The arms are more numerous in the eastern than in the western provinces. It is safe to estimate the number of rifles in the eastern district as at least twice the number of the soldiers. Commandante Villa and other officers made the statement that 40,000 rifles were being distributed among the people of that district. We have seen no proof of this statement. Ammunition is said to be plentiful, and it appears so from the fact that the soldiers use it freely hunting deer. With regard to the total force of the Philippine army, actual and reserve, we cannot speak from our own knowledge.

“Co’lonel Tirona claimed that 200,000 men from all the islands could be put on the field well armed; and several other officers have independently given the same statement. Every officer that we have seen carried a Spanish sword and revolver. They wear these weapons constantly, but regard them with contempt, preferring the bola at close quarters. The ‘Philippina,’ which was at Aparri during our visit, carries two guns of a calibre of about three inches. These are the only guns we have seen, with the exception of two revolving cannons in the *palacio* at Malolos. We saw no fortifications. The Spaniards have left numerous stockades in the wilder regions, and the natives have built a few others. There are also numerous barricades, thrown up during the insurrection. In the towns the Spaniards defended themselves in the houses for want of protection. The military spirit pervades the eastern district, where every town and *barrio* has organized companies of its children, which are drilled every day. In the western district we did not see any children under arms. The officers have had no military education except that which they gained during the insurrection. Spanish drill tactics are used, and most of the officers are still studying the elementary text-book.

“Respectfully submitted,

“W. B. WILCOX,

“Paymaster, U. S. N.

“LEONARD R. SARGENT,

“Naval Cadet, U. S. N.”

OPINIONS OF HON. JOHN BARRETT, FORMER UNITED STATES
MINISTER TO SIAM.

[NOTE.—The Honorable John Barrett, formerly United States minister to Siam, and well known during the recent Presidential campaign as an able public speaker on behalf of the Administration, contributed an article on "Some Phases of the Philippine Situation" to the "Review of Reviews" for July, 1899, page 65, and an article on "America in the Pacific and Far East" to "Harper's Magazine" for November, page 917. These articles are not quoted here at length as they are so readily accessible, but a few paragraphs are inserted verbatim.]

[REVIEW OF REVIEWS, JULY, 1899.]

[PAGE 68.]

"The government which was organized by Aguinaldo at Cavite and continued first at Bakoor and later at Malolos developed into a much more elaborate affair than its most ardent supporters had originally expected. By the middle of October, 1898, he had assembled at Malolos a congress of one hundred men who would compare in behavior, manner, dress, and education with the average men of the better classes of other Asiatic nations, possibly including the Japanese. These men, whose sessions I repeatedly attended, conducted themselves with great decorum and showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavorably with the Japanese parliament. The executive portion of the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed to understand their respective positions. Each general division was subdivided with reference to practical work. There was a large force of under secretaries and clerks, who appeared to be kept very busy with routine labor."

[PAGE 70.]

"In this connection it must be remembered that the majority of the Filipino adults, who reside in the great populous sections to the north and south of Manila can read and write, and that according to the statement of reliable members of Aguinaldo's staff fully seventy per cent of the men in the ranks of the Filipino army could likewise read and write."

[PAGE 73.]

"In the matter of native participation I am a believer that they are capable of a much larger degree of responsibility than that for which they are commonly given credit. When I consider how well in view of all conditions the Siamese are governing their little country and are really making decided progress, and when again I see how prosperous

the Malay Protected States are, judging from my own personal study of these countries, I do not see any reason why a large proportion of the responsible positions should not be held by the leading Filipinos.

"There are a group of capable, educated men, at the head of whom is Arrelano, who can compare very favorably with a similar group of governing men not only in Siam and in the Malay states, but even in Japan. Associated with Aguinaldo also are a number of men who, never favoring a new policy in dealing with the United States, but following him rather than desert the Filipino cause, will be eventually faithful servants to our Government. The fact that a large number of the Filipinos have fought against us does not mean that they may not possess some qualities of self-government, well guided. This fighting may have rather proved that they have an executive capacity, a power of organization, and a persistency of effort for which otherwise we would probably never have given them credit. We must remember, also, that actual government that existed at Malolos. While in many respects the Filipinos' management of their affairs reminded one of a child with a new toy, yet every observer, military, civil, or naval, who went to Malolos, or who in the earlier days saw the development of the government at Cavite or Bakoor was impressed with the apparent order, system, and formality with which everything was done. These are qualities that count in organizing government. There were at the same time numerous tendencies to display, superficial consideration, and insincerity of action that showed the necessity of a steady hand in order to get at the true essence of government."

[HARPER'S MAGAZINE, NOVEMBER, 1899.]

[PAGE 925.]

"The best comparison I can make is to repeat the one I have given before: compared to Nipon, the principal island of Japan, through the interior of which I have travelled from one end to the other, the advantage, except in area and population, is much in favor of Luzon, the chief island of the Philippine group. What is true of Luzon is true of the other islands in a lesser degree, with a few exceptions."

[PAGE 926.]

"In times of peace there is more to commend than to censure in the character of the Filipino, and he stands well the test of comparison with Siamese, Japanese, Annamese, and Malays, to whom he is related. There are sufficient able and educated men among them to develop a large degree of autonomy or self-government. With high-class Americans exercising a guiding and encouraging hand there is no reason why, eventually, with training and experience, the Filipinos should not attain all the privileges of absolute independence, and be

protected from the dangers and limitations that its actual trial would entail. The more autonomy earned and merited by the Filipinos the better for us, as we shall escape the responsibility and evils of a large colonial staff appointed by political influence. If we have good and wise men, prompted by patriotic and unselfish motives, to advise the Filipinos and steady them during the first four years of our administration, we shall be surprised at the result of our efforts, and shoulder successfully our share of the ‘white man’s burden.’”

ACCOUNTS OF GENERALS AND CONSULS.

[NOTE.—The foregoing accounts of the workings of the insurgent government are statements of eye witnesses. The following reports from generals and consuls who, from the nature of the situation, spoke on this subject from hearsay, are inserted for the sake of completing as far as possible the information on this topic. It will be noted, also, that all these accounts, with the exception of General Otis’s, are of a much earlier date than the accounts of eye witnesses given above, being written before the Malolos Congress had assembled.]

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 337.]

“*Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore.*

“No. 63.]

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

“*Hong Kong, July 18, 1898.*

[*Summary of omitted paragraphs:* Spain cannot regain the Philippines. Superior character of the native leaders over both Malays and Cubans. They want United States citizenship. Falsity of statement that Aguinaldo sold his country for gold. Interviews with insurgent leaders.]

“On May 2, Aguinaldo arrived in Hong Kong and immediately called on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States ship “McCulloch,” and I put him aboard in the night, so as to save any complications with the local government. Immediately upon the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite, he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offence to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator,—an absolutely necessary step, if he hoped to maintain control over the natives,—and from that date until the present time, he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field, and dignified and just as the head of his government. According to his own statements to me by letter, he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans, and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church. He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul Williams, and his own junta here in Hong Kong, and

nothing of moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe that he was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate.

"The insurgents are fighting for freedom from the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of justice that controls all the actions of our government as to their future.

"[Insurgent government of Philippines cannot be dealt with capriciously.]

"I have the honor, etc.,

"ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN, *Consul-General.*"

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGES 12, 13.]

"[Extract.]

"HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,

"U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

"*Carite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.*

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,

"*Washington, D. C.:*

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader.

"It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic sort of government. I wrote such a protest but did not publish it at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship.

"These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers. * * * * *

[Stars are as given in the Senate Document.]

"THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

"*Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.*

"True copy:

"J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*"

[REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, FROM MAY 1 TO
AUGUST 13, 1898. PAGE 57.]

“ HONGKONG, July 22, 1898.

“ SECRETARY OF NAVY, Washington:

“ The following is for the Secretary of War: Aguinaldo declares dictator (ship) and martial law over all the islands. The people expect independence. Recommend China ponies.

“ ANDERSON, Commanding.

“ DEWEY.”

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 422 TO 425.]

From “ Memoranda concerning the Situation in the Philippines on August 30, 1898, by F. V. Greene, Major-General Volunteers, and accompanying papers.”

“ On the 18th of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a dictatorial government, with himself as dictator. In each village or pueblo a chief (jefe) was to be elected, and each ward a headman (cabeza); also in each pueblo three delegates,— one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. These were to constitute the junta or assembly, and after consulting the junta the chiefs of pueblos were to elect a chief of province and three counsellors,— one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. They were also to elect one or more representatives from each province to form the revolutionary congress.

“ This was followed, on June 20, by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23, another decree followed changing the title of the government from dictatorial to revolutionary, and of the chief officer from dictator to president; announcing a cabinet, with a minister of foreign affairs, marine, and commerce, another of war and public works, another of police and internal order, justice, instruction, and hygiene, and another of taxes, agriculture, and manufactures; the powers of the president and congress were defined, and a code of military justice was formulated.

“ At the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the revolution. On June 27, another decree was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6, an address was issued to foreign governments stating that the revolutionary government was in operation and control in fifteen provinces, and that in response to a petition of the duly elected chiefs of these provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and independence. Translations of these various documents all appended [omitted in this pamphlet], marked, ‘B,’ ‘C,’ ‘D,’ ‘E,’ ‘F,’ ‘G,’ and ‘H.’

"The scheme of government is set forth in the decree of June 23 marked 'D.' An examination of this document shows that it provides for a dictatorship of the familiar South American type. All power is centred in the president, and he is not responsible to any one for his acts. He is declared to be 'the personification of the Philippine public, and in this view cannot be held responsible while he holds office. His term will last until the Revolution triumphs.' He appoints not only the heads of departments, but all their subordinates, and without reference to Congress. This body is composed of a single chamber of representatives from each province. The election is to be conducted by an agent of the President, and the qualifications of electors are 'those inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct.'

"If any province is still under Spanish rule its representative is to be appointed by the President. Congress is to deliberate on 'all grave and transcendental questions whose decision admits of delay and adjournment, but the President may decide questions of urgent character, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to Congress.' The acts of Congress are not binding until approved by the President, and he has the power of absolute veto.

"Congress was to hold its first session at Malolos about September 20.

"While this scheme of government is a pure despotism, yet it claims to be only temporary, and intended to 'prepare the country so that a true republic may be established.* It also provides a rude form of governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the province. To what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say.† Aguinaldo claims in his address of August 6, that it is in force in fifteen provinces, whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about one half of Luzon. None of these (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communication with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut off since May 1.

"In the province of Cavite and that portion of the province of Manila outside of the city and its suburbs, which was occupied by the insurgent troops, as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence,

* This claim that the purely despotic government should be only temporary is borne out by later events. See Report of Wilcox and Sargent above. See, also, General Otis's Report, page 33, below. The constitution of the Philippine Republic was adopted January 23, 1899.

† For evidence on this point, see Report of Wilcox and Sargent above. Their tour was made about two months later than this, when the machinery had had a little more chance to get into running order.

occupying the principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of civil government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contributions not only in the outside villages but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and business, and it was reported that his cabinet officers were in constant session there. Aguinaldo himself never failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the *de facto* ruler of the country.

"The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23 (copy herewith marked 'J**) as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent—a notice which it is hardly necessary to say was ignored. The day after the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same general asking for our plans of attack so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.

"Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt upon his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as military governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the military government which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no farther, with arms in their hands; he asked for possession of the water works, which was given; and while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.

"The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in solution. The

* This letter is reproduced in Appendix B, page 57, and should be compared with the above statement of its contents.

United States government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made use of them for distinctly military purposes, viz., to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish government prior to the arrival of our troops; and for this purpose the admiral allowed them to take arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other provinces. But the admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurance of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration; but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our own fleet and army.

"There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of twenty eight years; prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster and afterwards a *gobernadorcillo* and municipal captain in one of the pueblos of the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for president were held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of the insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides himself on his military ability, and if a republic could be established the post he would probably choose for himself would be general-in-chief of the army.

"In the next place, Aguinaldo's government, or any entirely independent government, does not command the hearty support of the large body of Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education, and intelligence. Their hatred of Spanish rule is very keen, and they will co-operate with Aguinaldo or any one else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine republic under American protection, such as they have heard is to be granted in Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it -- what portion of the government is to be administered by them and what portion by us, how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses are to be divided -- they have no clearly defined ideas at all; nor is it to be expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule, without any experience in self-government. The senti-

ment of this class—the educated natives with property at stake—looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.

"Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo* insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect, but five sixths of the entire Christian population is composed of the Tagalos and Visayans. The former live in Mindoro and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo, and other islands in the centre of the group. The Tagalos are more numerous than the Visayans, but both races are about equal in civilization, intelligence, and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that the Visayans are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send representatives to the Congress. But it is a fact that the Visayans have taken no active part in the present insurrection nor in that of 1896; that the Spanish government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo and in the Visayas Islands and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The Visayans number nearly two million, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes, they will oppose him.

"Upon one point all are agreed, except possibly Aguinaldo and his immediate adherents, and that is, that no native government can maintain itself without the active support and protection of a strong foreign government. This being admitted, it is difficult to see how any foreign government can give this protection without taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account."

[REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, PAGE 50 OF REPORT OF SECRETARY OF WAR FOR 1898.]

"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay the principal leader of the insurgents, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hong Kong, and, with consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government

* This was written August 30, 1898. In December of that same year, however, we find that the inhabitants of Iloilo had joined the insurrection and professed allegiance to the Malolos government. See Otis's Report.

of republican form with himself as president, and, at the time of our arrival in the islands, the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivisions of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila."

[REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL E. S. OTIS, U. S. VOLUNTEERS, ON AFFAIRS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR 1899, PAGE 15.]

[NOTE.—General Otis does not give any consecutive account of the insurgent government. The following extracts contain practically everything said on this subject in his report. His remarks about it, as will be seen, are almost uniformly derogatory; they show, however, that it possessed enough power to perform many governmental functions and to make itself a decided element in the situation he had to confront.]

"The insurgents, too, whose government had taken firm root at Malolos, were, through the medium of the President, Cabinet, and Congress, reeling off decrees and constitutional provisions at a rapid rate. Their army was continually successful against the small Spanish garrisons scattered throughout the islands, and they were beginning to acquire the belief that they were invincible. Revenue was their need and desire, and this they began to derive quite largely from imposing export duties on all products shipped to Manila from any shipping point in their possession, compelling the merchants to pay on their property some ten per cent ad valorem upon removal. These many obstacles so impeded commerce that trade languished and the customs revenues were greatly impaired."

[PAGE 41.]

"Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on the intent of the United States with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak *ex cathedra*. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government *de facto*, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government."

[PAGE 43.]

"My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated that conditions were improving, and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration;

that I had conferred with a number of the members of the revolutionary government, and thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission to the United States authority."

[PAGE 75.]

"From August, 1898, to the time the treaty of Paris came from the representatives of the contracting governments, the insurgents had maintained their military lines around Manila, on the plea that they desired to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain, should she return to her late possessions. As soon as the result of the treaty negotiations became known, the dishonesty of that plea became fully apparent. Then the crisis in the insurgent government was at hand. Aguinaldo and his able adviser, Mabini, the man who had furnished the brains for the radical element and who, in fact, was the government, proposed to transfer the declaration of open hostilities from Spain to the United States. This the conservative members of the cabinet would not countenance, and the result was their withdrawal. Mabini was able to form a new cabinet with himself as dictator, and to dominate the remaining members of congress. Independence was the cry and the extermination of the Americans the determination. They then sought an excuse to inaugurate hostilities, but the United States had kept strictly within its legal rights and had simply performed its international obligations. Repeated efforts were made to secure some mark of recognition for their government from the American authorities, some of which appeared to be quite cunningly devised. I was addressed by so-called ministers of state on diplomatic subjects, and was visited by accredited members of the Malolos government. The various foreign consuls resident in Manila were officially informed by this government of its proceedings and furnished with copies of its so-called decrees. Never since the time Aguinaldo returned to Cavite in May of 1898 and placed himself under the masterful spirit of Mabini had he the slightest intention to accept the kind offices and assistance of the United States, except as they might be employed to hold Spain throttled while he worked the scheme of self-aggrandizement. His success was not in the least astonishing, as after the various islands had driven out the few remaining and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enemy, they naturally turned to Luzon for some form of central government, the islands of the south being well aware of their inability to maintain successful separate and distinct political establishment. The crude one in process of formation in Luzon offered itself through its visiting agents and was accepted in part (notwithstanding race animosities and divergent business interests) and very probably because no other alternative was offered. The eight

months of opportunity given the ambitious Tagalo, by the hold on Spain which the United States maintained, was sufficient also for him to send his troops and designating men into the distant provinces and hold the unarmed natives in subjection until he imposed military authority, and thus in December, 1898, we find in northern and southeastern Luzon, in Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands the aggressive Tagalo present in person, and whether civilian or soldier supreme in authority. The success which attended the political efforts of Aguinaldo and his close associates, and gave them such sudden and unexpected power was not calculated to induce them to accept subordinate positions in a re-established government, and the original premeditated intention to control supremely at least a portion of the Filipino people had become firmly fixed. The cry for liberty and independence (really license and despotism under their governing methods) and the vile aspersions of the motives of the United States, which they have widely circulated, have served them to stir up distrust and fear of the American among the people to a considerable extent, especially those of Tagalo origin."

[PAGES 84, 85.]

"MANILA, P. I., Jan. 27, 1899.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

"The following received: —

"PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
"OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"Major-General E. S. OTIS,

"Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces of Occupation in
Manila:

"My Government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to-day enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people,—a people making superhuman efforts to vindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers.

"To this end, of the governments to-day recognized and observed among cultured nations, they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of reason and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life.

"And, taking the liberty to notify your excellency, I confidently hope that, doing justice to the Philippine people, you will be pleased

to inform the Government of your nation that the desire of mine, upon being accorded official recognition, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.

" May God keep your excellency many years.

" EMILIO AGUINALDO.

[Seal of the Revolutionary
Government of the Philippines.]

" A. MABINI.

" OTIS.

" MALOLOS, Jan. 23, 1899."

[PAGES 87, 88.]

" During this period rapidly succeeding significant events were fast approaching a state of war and strongly indicated the fixed determination of the insurgent government to drive the United States from Luzon as soon as it could gather its men in sufficient numbers. It was perfecting its intrenchments around us, planting its guns, concentrating its troops, and bringing up its army supplies, though still publicly asserting its desire for peace."

[PAGE 90.]

[NOTE.— In what follows, General Otis is describing the reception of Colonel Barry, whom he had sent with a letter to Aguinaldo.]

" Aguinaldo's secretary received the letter, stating that he would present it and make known General Otis's request. Soon after he returned, conveying General Aguinaldo's regrets that press of business did not permit him to accord the personal interview requested, and the colonel was referred to President Mabini, of the cabinet. Mabini received him graciously, and quite a lengthy interview followed. Mabini assured him, in substance, that the insurgent government had exerted itself to maintain friendly relations with the Americans; had thus far succeeded; that it would continue to make exertion to this end, but that it could not control its people beyond a certain point, as they were greatly excited; that his government would do all in its power to effect an amicable adjustment of pending difficulties. The communication which Colonel Barry presented was the one of January 9, in response to Aguinaldo's letter of that date, in which he announced the appointment of the insurgent commission and which appears on a former page."

[PAGE 94.]

" General Aguinaldo was now at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed rebellion which had raised its head in central Luzon. He had assembled a pliant congress, many members of which had been appointed by him to represent far distant congressional districts, and which had voted him the dictator of the lives and fortunes

of all the inhabitants of the Philippines. He dominated Manila, and, when he ordered that the birthday of the martyred Rizal should be appropriately observed there, business was paralyzed and not a native dared to pursue his accustomed daily labors. Not a province had the courage to oppose his appointed governors, backed by their Taga guards, although a few of the governors had previously suffered martyrdom for the zeal exhibited in collecting money and sequestering private property. The southern islands were obedient. The appointed governor for one, and that one not eager for independence, wrote in January: —

'To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines:

'HONORABLE SIR: This government has received the respected communication from the presidency under your command, ordering that under no pretext whatever are Americans or other foreign troops to be permitted to land on this island, which order it will be my pleasant duty to comply with as far as the scanty forces under my command will permit. I have, under to-day's date, ordered the officials under my command in charge of the towns of this province to follow the same instructions, under pain of the most severe penalties.

'I have the honor to reply as above to the communication before cited.

'God guard you for many years for our liberty and independence.'

"He was hailed from Europe as the savior of his country and as first of 'the generous and noble Tagalo people,' and was assured of 'the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations.'"

[NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, FEBRUARY, 1900.]

From "Our Rule in the Philippines," by Brig.-Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., late Major-General, U. S. V., in command of the First Expeditionary Land Force from the United States to the Philippine Islands, p. 282.

"After the assembling of a Filipino congress at Malolos, with representatives from the other islands, there was but little hope of a peaceful solution. Restrained by diplomatic and philanthropic considerations, we had given them time to organize their revolutionary government and to consolidate their power. Naturally they did not wish to stultify themselves by making terms with us, when the only terms offered involved the absolute abrogation of their authority. The leaders were influenced by another consideration. All the religious orders, except the Jesuits, held valuable properties and concessions. The Dominicans, for instance, held large areas of rice lands south of the Pasig. A number of civil corporations held conces-

sions — or charters, as we call them — for railways, tramways, electric plants, water-works, etc. The leaders wished to enrich themselves by confiscating all these properties. In our treaty with Spain we were pleased to recognize all private and corporate rights. It was, therefore, evident to them that under our administration they could not carry out that project. The common people had been made to believe that, in accepting our rule, they would simply exchange one set of oppression for another. Yet there was a possibility of breaking the power of the Malolos government by conciliating the common people and winning over certain friendly military leaders. This was done in Negros, but never attempted in Luzon; yet this was the method by which the British power was established in India. We know how to fight, but we do not know how to conquer, if the accepted principle of dividing to conquer is to be rejected."

[NOTE. — There is further evidence as to the effectiveness of the Insurgent Government in the letters written by Roque Lopez (who signs himself "President of the Federal Government, Bisayas") to Brig.-Gen. M. P. Miller when the latter wished to occupy Iloilo with American troops in January, 1899. These letters are given in Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, pages 50 ff., and are to be fully considered in Pamphlet VI. of this series, "Iloilo: an Incident of January, 1899." Here we merely note that the representatives of the Insurgent Government at Iloilo firmly declined to take any steps without authority from the "Central Revolutionary Government at Malolos," stating (Senate Document 208, page 55) that the authority of this government "is founded in sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc. It is also founded principally on our political constitution, which began at the insurrection and has been manifested in all its doings, so that the authority of the government of Malolos over us began at a date long before the Treaty of Paris."]

PART II.

ARE THE FILIPINOS CAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT?

[NOTE.—There has been much confusion in the public mind with regard to the right of the Filipinos to self-government. It can hardly be said that it is their right if they would certainly abuse it. It has been widely taken for granted that they would so abuse it, and that since we have made ourselves responsible before the world for maintaining order in the Philippines we must ourselves establish and support an effective government there. Probably no one believes that the Filipinos could at present govern themselves as well as we could govern them in case they wished for our government; but since they are resisting our government, is it not our first duty to ascertain whether we have been right in our belief that the Filipinos are on such a low plane of civilization as to give us the right to stand *in loco parentis* to them even against their will?

Major-Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V., cabled to Washington, December 30, 1898: "Conditions here at Manila and character of inhabitants not understood in the United States." (See Otis's Report for 1899, page 61.) It is the purpose of this pamphlet to contribute its mite toward such an understanding of the character of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as every American citizen should aim to possess.

It will undoubtedly be granted that the doctrine of the consent of the governed is not a universal truth, but contemplates tolerably reasonable bodies of adult men. Therefore, no sharp line can be drawn around the cases to which it applies, but every reduction of a society to the type which the principle contemplates is a prodigious gain. In every state of society the contrary is, at best, a necessary evil. The principle, in a word, is an ideal toward which all societies should press, and it could not but be a grave transgression violently to hinder a weaker brother who is in sight of it, who has reached the debatable border land, from attaining what he aspires to. Has the Filipino reached the debatable border land? That is the question now before us, toward an answer to which this pamphlet hopes to contribute. The existence of a debate on the subject is in itself evidence of some value on this point.

It is a question of fact, and the testimony given on both sides is forcible and abundant.

The limits of this pamphlet forbid anything approaching a comprehensive collection of even the official evidence. We can give the opinions of the following observers only: (1) Our Commanding Officers in the Philippines; (2) Our Consuls; (3) Some historians of a period sufficiently remote to preclude partizanship as to the present controversy. It will be noticed that the above list of authorities does not include The First Philippine Commission, appointed January 20, 1899, of which Dr. G. Jacob Schurman was President, and of which all but one member reached Manila March 4 of the same year. The Commissioners stated to the Philippine emissaries who came to them during April that "after a careful consideration and study it was the opinion of the Commission that the Philippine people were not capable of independent self-government" (Report of Commission, Vol. I., p. 7), and this opinion was repeated in their official report. We do not here quote from this report, as we propose to publish at an early date a careful digest of it. Here we merely note that an examination of the fitness of the inhabitants for self-government was not one of the Commission's delegated functions, such an examination not having been called for at all by their instructions from President McKinley. These instructions were in their main features as follows (see Report of Commission, Vol. I., p. 185): "In order to facilitate the most humane, pacific, and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure with the least possible delay the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants, I have named Jacob G. Schurman," etc.

"The Commissioners will endeavor, without interference with the military authorities of the United States now in control of the Philippines, to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements in public order may be practicable, and for this purpose they will study attentively the existing social and political state of the various populations, particularly as regards the forms of local government, the administration of justice, the collection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation, and the need of public improvements."

There is no word throughout the instructions of the possible fitness of the Filipinos for self-government, although the concluding paragraph mentions "the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation."]

1. OUR COMMANDING OFFICERS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 383.]

The War Department at Washington telegraphed Admiral Dewey August 26, 1898, asking him to send them his "views and information upon the subject of the Philippines." This he did in a letter written August 29, 1898, transmitted to the War Department by Brig.-Gen. F. V. Greene. A copy was given to Major-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., and used by him to accompany his statement before the Peace Commissioners in Paris. In this letter **Admiral Dewey says** :—

"The population of Luzon is reported to be something over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and under just laws and with the benefits of popular education would soon make good citizens.

"In a telegram sent to the department on June 23 I expressed the opinion that 'these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.' Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGES 22, 23.]

"*Memorandum for Major Bell, Major of Engineers.*

"AUGUST 21, 1898.

[*Summary of omissions*: Tell Aguinaldo I should like to meet him, to have the water supply turned on, to deal fairly with him, to have him visit Washington, to depose the Spanish officials and put his appointees in their place. Am expecting reinforcements and will quarter them in Cavite, if possible.]

"In conclusion I sincerely trust that there will be no friction in the future between our commands, and that the good feeling that we have made every attempt to foster will be encouraged by Aguinaldo and his chiefs. For myself and officers and men under my command I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect.

"WESLEY MERRITT,
"Major-General."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 369.]

From "Statement of Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., Oct. 4, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris."

"Mr. GRAY. Suppose, by final treaty with Spain, we should abandon Luzon and all the Philippines, exacting such terms and conditions and guarantees as we should think necessary, and abandon them entirely, reserving only a coaling-station, perhaps; what do you think they would do about it?

"General MERRITT. I think, in the island of Luzon, they would fight to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them, intelligent men, who said their lives were as nothing to them as compared with the freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government.

"Mr. DAVIS. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them?

"General MERRITT. No, sir.

"Mr. GRAY. Do you think, in the event of such an abandonment, it would be possible for them to set up a self-government?

"General MERRITT. It would take time to do it. They would have to be educated up to it. They want a protectorate, but they do not exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which is the kind of a protectorate they would like very much."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 374.]

From "Memorandum Concerning the Philippine Islands, made Aug. 27, 1898, by Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V."

"If the United States should evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond all possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards, individually, stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish Government is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge this themselves, and say their desire is for independence under American protection, but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative positions would

be—what part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue, and administering the government."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 404.]

From "Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philippines, by F. V. Greene, Major-General, Volunteers," used before the Peace Commission at Paris, August 30, 1898.

"The important islands are less than a dozen in number, and ninety per cent of the Christian population live on Luzon and the five principal islands of the Visayas group."

[PAGE 405.]

"The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, each speaking a different dialect, but five sixths of the Christian population are either Tagalos or Visayans. All the races are of the Malay type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great.

"As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) are of small stature, averaging probably five feet four inches in height and one hundred and twenty pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, somewhat darker than that of a mulatto. They seem to be industrious and hard working, although less so than the Chinese.

"By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, treacherous, cowardly, and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seemed industrious and docile, but there were occasional evidences of deceit and untruthfulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, arts, or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on the subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the monastic orders.

"In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors, and priests. They are well informed and have accumulated property. They have not travelled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of rich Filipinos in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The bibliography of the Philippines is said to number 4,500 volumes, the greater part of which has been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably less than a dozen."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 501, 502.]

Statement of General C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., before the United States Peace Commission, at Paris:—

"I talked with Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, an important military station on the line of the railroad, and they said that they had had good treatment only. The wives of two officers had lately visited their husbands in jail (one at Dagupan, 123 miles north), and gave same testimony. Aguinaldo, in a letter of August 1, to our late consul at Manila, Mr. Williams, said: 'Say to the Government at Washington, that the Filipinos people abominate savagery; that in the midst of our past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life.' I believe the natives to be brave (under good leadership), most tolerant of fatigue and hunger, and amenable to command and discipline, if justice and fair dealing rule. They are very temperate, as most of the natives of the East are. I have never seen a drunken one, and this, with the example of our soldiers, whom they imitate in everything else; very quiet, no loud quarrels, very good house servants and cooks.

"Their skill in trades, occupations, and professions is very great. Critics will call this imitation, but imitation of good things is not reprehensible. I refer now to the common people, and so will omit very able lawyers (one or two having ranked as the very best of all nationalities in the Philippines), and the higher professions.

"As accountants, they are excellent. In the custom house, sixty (more before) were employed during my administration. Any information desired,—say the amount of imports and exports of last year, kind of articles, whence obtained, and where going, duties, etc., — was sought from them, and the reply was always given in writing, in a neat, satisfactory manner. All the cash was received by a native, — \$1,020,000, from August 22 to October 21, — much of this in silver; all counterfeits and filled dollars were detected at once by his skill, and only one dollar was returned to us from the banks. His neighbor, who kept the record of receipts, was most systematic and able. The Spaniards depended on them absolutely for the clerical work of the office, and the same in other departments.

"I visited three factories for the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes. First, that of H. J. Andrews & Co., where 150 to 200 natives were employed; second, the Alhambra, which had 300, in April, now 600; third, the Insular, with 2,000. The Talacallera, largely owned in Paris, I was unable to see; it has 4,000. These working people seemed to me the best,—quiet, diligent, and skilful. The same qualities were apparent in the one cotton mill of the place, where at least 200 were employed.

"As mariners, quartermasters of large boats, and managers of small ones, their skill has been proverbial over the East for years, and we had great opportunities during our three weeks in the bay, of proving their ability and cleverness.

"Manila straw hats have been famous for years; also *pina* cloth and *jusi* cloth, the former made of pineapple fibre and the latter made of pineapple fibre and hemp.

"The station masters and employees of the Manila railway compare favorably with any I have ever seen at ordinary way stations. Clean, neat, prompt, well disciplined, their superiority is largely due to the excellence of the general manager, Mr. Higgins, a man of great ability. Still the quality is in the men. The three servants in his house (on the line), have all learned telegraphy by observation and imitation.

"I have also some fine samples of their embroidery.

"They are admittedly extraordinary musicians, and their orchestras and bands have found places all over the East, playing without notes, and with great harmony and sweetness. It seems to be instinct, and is all instrumental, with little or no vocal talent. All these accomplishments do not argue greatness, but they do show that they are something more than ignorant and brutal savages. I do not mean to ascribe to them all the virtues,—they may be liars and thieves; it is a wonder they are not worse after the environment and example of centuries,—but to my mind, they are the best of any barbaric or uncivilized race I have ever seen, and open, I trust, to a wonderful development."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 66, PAGE 44.]

"THE FILIPINOS AS THEY ARE.

"General King's Letter to Milwaukee 'Journal.'

"SAN FRANCISCO, June 22, 1899.

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL, MILWAUKEE, WIS.:

"Dear Sir,—Thinking over your telegram and request of June 7, I find myself seriously embarrassed. As an officer of the army, there are many reasons why I should not give my 'views of situation in the Philippines, how long fighting is likely to continue, and thoughts as to America's part in the future of the islands.'

"The capability of the Filipinos for self-government cannot be doubted. Such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name are highly educated; nine tenths of the people can read and write, all are skilled artisans in one way or another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better than our people imagine. In my

opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given right of suffrage.

"Very truly yours,

"CHARLES KING,

"*Brigadier-General.*"

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGES 380, 381.]

From Letter of J. F. Bell, Major of Engineers, in charge, to Major-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., dated Manila, August 29, 1898, and presented to the U. S. Peace Commissioners at Paris.

[NOTE.—This letter is introduced in addition to the opinions of the commanding officers, as being particularly forcible evidence to the effect that the Filipinos are incapable of self-government.]

"Concerning the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves I regret to say that I see no reason to change the opinion previously expressed, that they are unfit. I wish my opinion might be otherwise, for I prefer to believe them capable of self-government. There are a number of Filipinos whom I have met, among them General Aguinaldo and a few of his leaders, whom I believe thoroughly trustworthy and fully capable of self-government, and the main reliance for small official positions and many larger ones would be upon people who know no standard of government other than that the Spaniards have furnished. Their sense of equity and justice seems not fully developed, and their readiness to coerce those who come under their power has been strongly illustrated in this city since our occupation. A regularly organized system of blackmail has been instituted under the guise of making subscriptions to the insurgent cause. None of this money ever reaches the treasury of the so-called Filipino Government, but is doubtless divided among the petty chiefs who assume to authorize subordinates to collect it.

"The Filipinos themselves, living in the outskirts of the city, are daily terrorized and interfered with by small bands of marauding insurgents, who molest them for no other purpose but the accumulation of booty.

"Aguinaldo has in Hong Kong about \$300,000, and in Bacoor about \$220,000 of public funds. He has commissioned an agent to purchase all the nitrate of soda to be found in Manila, and a lot more in China and Japan. He has a cartridge factory at Imus capable of working 400 people. He proposes soon to move his headquarters to Malolos, on the railroad, north of Manila, and only about thirty minutes' ride from the city.

"There is not a particle of doubt but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a

colonial government here. They are especially bitter toward the Spaniards, but equally determined not to submit any longer to being a colony of any other government. What they would like best of all would be a Filipino Republic with an American protectorate, for none realize their inability more clearly than they to maintain a republic without protection of some stronger power. Though they would prefer protection from America, they would accept it from any government save Spain.

"Aguinaldo has not a universal following among the Filipinos. Though he is undoubtedly the most popular leader there is at present among the Filipinos, there are many of the wealthiest, most prominent and most influential Filipino citizens who do not follow him and would not vote for him as president, of their own free will and accord. The native population of Manila are generally opposed to the insurrectionists.

"A number of the rich and prominent Filipino citizens have told me that if the United States would govern this country for one year, Aguinaldo's following would so dwindle that he would have no army left.

"All the people, except the Spaniards, foreign residents, and natives feel alike, that a native government would be better than the continuation of Spanish rule; and I guess it would, for nothing could possibly be worse than the Spanish régime as it has long existed here. There is a very respectable and considerable number of Spaniards who openly condemn the corruption that has existed under the Spanish dominion, and doubtless many more would so express themselves if they dared."

2. CONSULS.

[REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, VOL. II., PAGE 249.]

"TESTIMONY OF O. F. WILLIAMS.

"MANILA, July 6 1899.

"Present: Colonel Denby (in the chair), Commissioner Worcester and Secretary MacArthur.

"O. F. Williams appeared before the Commission and in response to its interrogatories, stated as follows:—

"By COLONEL DENBY.

"Q. Will you tell us your name, residence and occupation? — A. O. F. Williams; American; residence, Rochester, N.Y.; acting as American consul at Manila for the entire group.

"Q. What positions, if any, did you fill prior to your appointment as consul here? — A. I was consul at Havre, France.

"Q. When were you appointed to Manila? — A. On the fifteenth day of October, 1897.

"Q. When did you get here? — A. On the 24th of January, 1898."

[PAGE 256.]

"Q. What is your opinion, Mr. Williams, of the capacity of these people for self-government? — A. Capacity—I think they possess it. Perhaps not to-day. Their education has been very narrow, not so limited as some people think in the numbers of people who have been somewhat educated, but the education of the individual person has been very narrow—confined largely to church lines—and not of sufficient liberality and breadth to enable them to appreciate such a form of government as we have. They have never been taught any such thing. It is a government of the few and submission by the many that they have been taught; but, so far as I can understand them, I believe they are quite as capable people as the Japanese, and the Japanese, as we know, in less than forty years have developed from a low grade of civilization to become one of the powers of the earth. They seem to me very like the Japanese.

"Q. Now, in the beginning, then, you think the government ought to be educative and somewhat strong, but by degrees it might develop into a self-government? — A. Yes."

"By PROFESSOR WORCESTER.

"Q. You say that there has been a misapprehension as to the number of people who have a reasonable education. What is your estimate as to the percentage of people who have had anything beyond a rudimentary or primary education? — A. I am unable to answer that. I have not been in the southern islands at all, and have not been fifty miles from Manila on land, and my answer would be valueless, I fancy, but little things lead me to that conclusion. For example, a great many natives come to my office and ask me for letters of identification—if I will not give them a letter to General MacArthur or Colonel McCoy or somebody—so they can go through the lines and come back with their horses and carriages, and I found that almost every one of these people could write. People who are bare-footed and almost naked still have been taught the rudiments, and I believe that quite a large per cent of the people, so far as I know them, have a smattering of education.

"Q. What I was trying to get at was, whether you based your statement on what you had seen in Manila or thereabouts. — A. Why you have a hundred times as much information on the Philippines as I have.

"Adjourned."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 336.]

*Letter of Rounsevelle Wildman, Consul-General, to J. B. Moore,
Acting Secretary of State.*

"No. 63.] "CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
"Hongkong, July 18, 1898.

"SIR [Summary of paragraphs omitted: Spain cannot regain the Philippines, judging from my experience of the native leaders.]

"I have lived among the Malays of the Straits Settlements and have been an honored guest of the different sultanates. I have watched their system of government and have admired their intelligence, and I rank them high among the semi-civilized nations of the earth. The natives of the Philippine Islands belong to the Malay race, and while there are very few pure Malays among their leaders, I think their stock has rather been improved than debased by admixture. I consider the forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I have been very closely connected, both the superiors of the Malays and the Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and Sandico are all men who would be leaders in their separate departments in any country, while among the wealthy Manila men, who live in Hong Kong, and who are spending their money liberally for the overthrow of the Spaniards and the annexation to the United States, men like the Cortes family and the Basa family would hold their own among bankers and lawyers anywhere.

[Summary of omissions: Sentiments of the political and financial leaders among the insurgents. Story of the "systematic attempt to blacken" Aguinaldo's character; the Spanish Bribe. My interviews with Agoncillo and others. Aguinaldo leaves Hong Kong for Cavite on board United States Steamship *McCulloch*. He organizes a necessary dictatorship and has been uninterruptedly successful in field and in council-chamber. Natives cannot be treated capriciously, and if not annexed to United States will demand independence.]

"I have the honor, etc.,
"ROUNSEVELLE WILDMAN,
"Consul-General."

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 346.]

Mr. Pratt to Mr. William R. Day, Secretary of State.

"No. 228.] "CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
"Singapore, June 8, 1898.

"Sir: I have the honor to submit an article from the London Spectator, which was reproduced in the Singapore Free Press of yesterday, and a reply thereto published to-day in the same paper, which last, I

think is deserving of special consideration, as being the expression of opinion of Mr. H. W. Bray,* one of the best authorities on the Philippines and the Filipinos.

"I have the honor to be, etc.,

"E. SPENCER PRATT,

"United States Consul-General."

[PAGE 349.]

"[Inclosure 2.—*Singapore Free Press*, June 8, 1898.]

"THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

"The author of the Spectator article, quoted in your yesterday's issue, under the above heading, has put forward one sensible proposition. His theories on other points may be all right, but I am afraid he has reckoned without his host. America has not yet conquered the Philippines,—not by a long way,—but will occupy them with the assistance and good will of the Filipinos. The possession of Manila no more means the possession of the Philippines, than the possession of New York means the possession of America; and without this good will and assistance of the inhabitants, I must beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other nation could ever hope to take the Philippines, except with an army of 200,000 men or more, if even then, no matter what theorists may say to the contrary. The solution which the European papers have been kind enough to put forward for the disposal of the Philippines may be dismissed with the words of General Augustiu's proclamation: 'Vain designs, ridiculous boasts!' When the time comes, I am inclined to think the inhabitants themselves are going to have the biggest say in this question, especially after the events of May 30 to June 1, last.

"Spain with an army of 35,000 men fully armed has been able to do nothing against an army of imperfectly organized Filipinos, who have never disposed of more than six hundred rifles. Yet nobody can taunt the Spanish soldier with want of valor, whilst his patient endurance of hardships and privations, indifferent food, and entire absence of personal comforts give him the advantage over other European soldiers who require an efficient commissariat and transport department. In a country like the Philippines a soldier to be effective must be able to skip from crag to crag like a goat, without hindrance or paraphernalia, to be evenly matched with the inhabitants.

"The Tagals will feel very much insulted if they try to garrison their villages by troops of the type proposed by the writer of the article under review. It would be a dangerous experiment. I would not

* At the time this opinion was expressed, Mr. H. W. Bray had been a merchant and planter in the Philippines for fifteen years.

advise the Americans or any one else to try. Such crass ignorance on the state of the Philippines and its inhabitants exists on every side, that it is almost useless to try and explain to outsiders that the Philippines are as different from British India, Ceylon, Burma, the West Indies, etc., as light is from darkness. The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch of the Malay race, and have been Christians for centuries, in fact longer than the principles of the Reformation were established in Great Britain, and are the nearest akin to European people of any alien race, and it is simply ridiculous to imagine that eight to ten millions of such people can be bought and sold as an article of commerce without first obtaining their consent. Let all those who are greedy for a slice of the archipelago ponder well over this before burning their fingers.

"To put them on a level with Sikhs and Afridis is simply nonsense. The much over-estimated Sikh would find his match pretty soon with the sturdy Philippine native, and those who think differently had better read what no less an authority than General Gordon says of his Philippine troops in the Taiping rebellion.

"No decent or respectable Filipino will tolerate any social relations with the pagan Chinese.

"The only possible solution of the Philippine question is an independent government, under American protection, and this is the policy I recommended to General Aguinaldo and his compatriots to accept, and which will, no doubt, be carried out. Time will show.

"H. W. BRAY.

"SINGAPORE, 8th June, 1898."

3. HISTORIANS.

[NOTE.—The following trio of authors was selected at random among the older books on the subject. A later and more extended search among these books has failed to unearth any authority whose statements do not in all essentials coincide with them, so they are allowed to stand as typical views of the Filipinos, always excepting the opinions expressed in the publications of the last few years.]

J. F. G. DE LA PEROUSE: "A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and 1788," published conformably to the decree of the National Assembly, of the 22d of April, 1791.

[PAGE 306.]

"The City of Manila, with its outskirts, is very considerable; its population is estimated at thirty-eight thousand souls, among which there are not more than a thousand or twelve hundred Spaniards, the

rest are Mulattoes, Chinese, or Indians, who cultivate all the arts, and carry on every species of industry."

[PAGE 308.]

"These different islands are peopled by three millions of inhabitants, and that of Luconia contains nearly a third of them. These people are, in my opinion, not at all inferior to Europeans; they cultivate the land with abundant skill; are carpenters, joiners, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, weavers, masons, etc. I have visited their villages, and have found them affable, hospitable, and honest; and though the Spanish speak of and even treat them with contempt, I have found that the vices, which they place to the account of the Indians, ought in justice to be attributed to the government they have established among them."

CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N.: "Narrative of the U. S. Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842." The author was commander of the Expedition, member of the American Philosophical Society, etc.

[VOLUME V., PAGE 296.]

"The natives of the Philippines are industrious. They manufacture an amount of goods sufficient to supply their own wants, particularly from Panay and Ylocos."

[PAGES 291, 292.]

"The Igorrotes, who dwell in the mountains, are the only natives who have not been subjected by the Spaniards. The other tribes have become identified with their rulers in religion, and it is thought by this circumstance alone has Spain been able to maintain the ascendancy with so small a number over such a numerous, intelligent and energetic race as they are represented to be."

W. GIFFORD PALGRAVE : "Ulysses, or Scenes and Studies in Many Lands." Resident in Uruguay, author of "Central Arabia," etc., London, 1887.

[PAGES 142 AND 143.]

"Indeed, of the 8,000,000, so runs the admitted though only approximate census, that enlisted, the Philippine, Europeans, Chinese, all foreigners whatsoever, taken together, do not make up a hundredth part; nor do the thinly scattered and unprolific Negritos add much to the extra-Malayan muster. Nor again, in a general sketch like this, do the varieties offered by the Philippine-Malayan population within itself require more than a passing indication. The chief are those which correspond with tolerable geographical exactness to a triple division of the Archipelago into Northern, Central, and Southern.

"Thus the Iloian Malays occupy the North, the Tagals the centre, and the Visayans the south. Of these three sub-races, the first named are the largest and sturdiest in physical build, but of lower mental average and less general adaptability than the other two; the second, a smaller statured, darker complexioned, and sinewy race, and are distinguished above all others for energy of character, intelligence, and perseverance; the Visayans, graceful even to beauty in form, and gentle in manner, differ little in natural capacity and endowments from the better sort of their congenors in Borneo. . . . But the persistent, strongly marked Malay type, whether absolutely pure as among the Visayans or dashed with foreign strain, here more, here less, as is the case among the Tagals, Iloians and their sub-branches, predominates in all.

"Once recognized that type can never be mistaken; and it alone would, even in the absence of other testimony, suffice to assert the Mongolian kinship of the Malay. The rounded head, the small but expressive black eye, with its slight upward and outward turn, the straight, dark hair, smooth skin, and small extremities, hands and feet, are not less distinctly the physical countersigns of Turanian origin than are the tenacious purpose, the organizing and yet more the cohesive power, the limited inventiveness, and the more than conservative immutability, its mental characteristics. Add to these a concentrated, never-absent self-respect, with its natural result, a habitual self-restraint in word and deed, then only, and that very rarely, broken through where extreme provocation induces the transitory but fatal frenzy known as "*amok*," and in one deadly hour the Malay casts to the winds every feeling, every thought except that of bloody, indiscriminating revenge; add an inbred courtesy, equally diffused through all classes, low or high, unfailing decorum, prudence, caution, quiet cheerfulness, ready hospitality, a correct though not an inventive taste, and a marked tendency to ancestral worship: such are, as described by the keenest of observers and most truthful of narrators, in his *Malay Archipelago*, the general attributes of the Malay race; and such are abundantly shared in by the inhabitants of the Philippines, though here they have undergone certain modifications, some favorable, some the reverse."

NOTE.

"The Inhabitants of the Philippines," by Frederic H. Sawyer, Memb. Inst. C. E., Inst. N. A., gives a careful study of the Filipinos, and should be read by anyone caring to go into the matter exhaustively. A portion of the preface is printed below, as a valuable summary of various authorities not here quoted.

"PREFACE.

"The writer feels that no English book does justice to the natives of the Philippines, and this conviction has impelled him to publish his own more favorable estimate of them. He arrived in Manila with a thorough command of the Spanish language, and soon acquired a knowledge of the Tagal dialect. His avocations brought him into contact with all classes of the community,—officials, priests, landowners, mechanics, and peasantry,—giving him an unrivalled opportunity to learn their ideas and observe their manners and customs. He resided in Luzon for fourteen years, making trips on business or for sport all over the Central and Southern provinces, also visiting Cebu, Iloilo, and other ports in Visayas, as well as Calamianes, Cuyos, and Palawan.

"Old Spanish chroniclers praise the good breeding of the natives, and remark the quick intelligence of the young.

"Recent writers are less favorable: Canamaque holds them up to ridicule, Monteverde denies them the possession of any good quality, either of body or mind.

"Foreman declares that a voluntary concession of justice is regarded by them as a sign of weakness; other writers judge them from a few days' experience of some of the cross-bred corrupted denizens of Manila.

"Mr. Whitelaw Reid denounces them as rebels, savages, and treacherous barbarians.

"Mr. McKinley is struck by their ingratitude for American kindness and mercy.

"Senator Beveridge declares that the inhabitants of Mindanao are incapable of civilization.

"It seems to have been left to French and German contemporary writers, such as Dr. Montano and Professor Blumentritt, to show a more appreciative, and, the author thinks, a fairer spirit, than those who have requited the hospitality of the Filipinos by painting them in the darkest colors. It will be only fair to exempt from this censure two American naval officers, Paymaster Wilcox and Mr. L. S. Sar-

gent, who travelled in North Luzon and drew up a report of what they saw.

"As regards the accusation of being savages, the Tagals can claim to have treated their prisoners of war, both Spaniards and Americans, with humanity, and to be fairer fighters than the Boers.

"The writer has endeavored to describe the people as he found them. If his estimate of them is more favorable than that of others, it may be that he exercised more care in declining to do business with, or to admit to his service, natives of doubtful reputation; for he found his clients punctual in their payments, and his employes, workmen, and servants, skilful, industrious, and grateful for benefits bestowed."

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 208, PAGE 89.]

“ (Translation.)

“ *My Beloved Fellow Countrymen* : I accepted the treaty proposed by Don Pedro H. Paterno, agreeing with the Captain-General of these islands that under certain conditions, and laying down arms and dismissing forces under my immediate control, because I believed it better for the country than to carry on the insurrection for which resources were lacking, but since the failure to fulfil any of the conditions, certain bands were dissatisfied and remained under arms, and since a period of five months has elapsed without any step toward the reforms which we demand to advance our country to the rank of a civilized nation, like our neighbor Japan, which in a little more than twenty years has advanced to a satisfactory position, and demonstrated her power and vigor in the late war with China, while the Spanish Government remains powerless to contend with certain obstacles which constantly arrest the progress of our country with a deadly influence, which has been a principal factor in causing the uprising of the people. Now that the great and powerful North American nation have come to offer disinterested protection for the effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to assume command of all the forces for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility, assisted by the advice of eminent persons, until these islands are completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a president and a cabinet in whose favor I will duly resign the authority.

“ Given in Cavite, the 24th of May, 1898.

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

APPENDIX B.

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 440.]

“ J.

“ Letter from Señor Aguinaldo to General Anderson.

“ JULY 23, 1898.

“ BRIG.-GEN. T. M. ANDERSON, U. S. A., etc., Cavite:

“ In answer to the letter of your Excellency, dated the 22d of the present month, I have the honor to manifest to you the following : —

“ That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of Cavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything that I might find in the same, including the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But as he was aware that said effects belonged to the personal property (ownership) of a Filipino who traded with them by virtue of a contribution to the Spanish government, I would not have touched them had not the owner placed them at my disposition for the purposes of war.

“ I came from Hong Kong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place to (to allow) any internal discord, because (being) a judge of their desires I had the strong conviction that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires.

“ Thus it is that at the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from the Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they (the provinces) might be justly represented and administered to their satisfaction.

“ It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers; but we expect that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude.

“ Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans and to the favors

which we have received through Admiral Dewey, and being more desirous than any other of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial not alone to my nation, but also to that of your Excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your Excellency the necessity that before disembarking troops you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied, and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form, and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgressions against friendship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I cannot answer for that which another nation, whose friendship is not well guaranteed, might inspire in it (the people); and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed to the North American people in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

6-21-28
;hangar

Worcester
Philippine Coll.

Sec. 1
No. 3
ARE THE FILIPINOS CAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT?

New matter introduced into the revised edition of Pamphlet
III., First Series, — Insurgent Government of 1898.

3. OPINIONS OF THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION.

[NOTE.—The Report of the First Philippine Commission, commonly called the "Schurman Commission," opens a large question, which it is the purpose of the editors to consider in a later pamphlet. Here they will refer but briefly to its position on the question in hand.

First of all it should be noted that President McKinley's letter of instructions to the Commission (Vol. I., page 185) does not call for a consideration of the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government, but rather emphasizes the necessity of extending throughout the islands the sovereignty of the United States as established by the Treaty of Paris. In accordance with these instructions, the Commissioners stated in their proclamation, issued shortly after their arrival (Vol. I. of the Report, page 5), "The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago, and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin." The attitude of the Commissioners toward the possibility of Philippine independence is shown by the following extracts: —]

[REPORT, VOL. I., PAGE 9.]

"One matter, however, they [the first emissaries from Aguinaldo] were told could not be discussed; that was the sovereignty of the United States. That matter, it was said, had been already settled by the Treaty of Paris, and being so settled was a fact which was now beyond the realm of profitable discussion.

"Speaking of the matter of independence, the Commission pointed out that by the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris it was provided that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants were to be determined by Congress. They were told that after a careful consideration and study, it was the opinion of the Commission that the Philippine people were not capable of independent self-government, and that independence, for which some of them said they were fighting, was, in the opinion of the Commission, an ideal at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but because of their inability to preserve it among the nations even if it were granted."

[PRELIMINARY REPORT, PAGE 181.]

"The most striking and perhaps the most significant fact in the entire situation is the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the archipelago, the diversity of their languages (which are mutually unintelligible), and the multifarious phases of civilization—ranging all the way from the highest to the lowest—exhibited by the natives of the several provinces and islands. In spite of the general use of the Spanish language by the educated classes, and the considerable similarity of economic and social conditions prevalent in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, the masses of the people are without a common speech, and they lack the sentiment of nationality. The Filipino people are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type."

[NOTE.—In order to understand the tribal question thus referred to in the preliminary report, one should study carefully and fully the text and figures of pages 11 to 16 in the later report concerning this matter. Such a study shows that the inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayan Islands number the great majority of the population. The racial question is thus summarized on page 11 (Vol. I. of the Report): "The inhabitants of the Philippines belong to three sharply distinct races—the Negrito race, the Indonesian race, and the Malayan race." The accompanying figures show that the Negritos number about 25,000, the Indonesians some 250,000, and the Malayans between seven and eight million. The ethnological problem of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands will be considered more fully in a later pamphlet.]

[PAGE 182.]

"For the bald fact is, that the Filipinos have never had any experience in governing themselves."

[PAGE 183.]

"Their lack of education and political experience, combined with their racial and linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues, to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. . . .

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the Commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers, and the eventual division of the islands among them."

[NOTE.—These conclusions of the Commission have been widely quoted by the press and in political discussions, and are all that many people know of the findings of the Commission. To do full justice, however, to

their position, certain portions of their Final Report, which are little known, should not be disregarded. To this end the following passages are quoted.]

[REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, VOL I., PAGE 12.]

“The civilized and Christianized peoples, although few in number, include the majority of the inhabitants.”

[PAGE 16.]

“The majority of the inhabitants of the Philippines, then, are possessed of a considerable degree of civilization.”

[PAGE 41.]

“In view of the facts above set forth, it must be admitted that the average native has never as yet had an opportunity to show what he can do. The attainments of some of his fellows who have had exceptional advantages have been such as to dispose the Commission to credit him with ability of no mean order.”

[PAGES 119, 120.]

“Encouraging Prospects for the Government of the Philippines.

“The Commission, while not underrating the difficulty of governing the Philippines, is disposed to believe the task easier than is generally supposed. For this confidence it has the following among other grounds: First, the study by educated Filipinos of the various examples of constitutional government has resulted in their selection, as best adapted to the conditions and character of the various peoples inhabiting the archipelago, of almost precisely the political institutions and arrangements which have been worked out in practice by the American people; and these are also, though less definitely apprehended, the political ideas of the masses of the Philippine people themselves. This point has been frequently illustrated in the course of the preceding exposition, and it must here suffice to say that the Commission was constantly surprised by the harmony subsisting between the rights, privileges, and institutions enjoyed by the Americans, and the reforms desired by the Filipinos. Secondly, in addition to the adaptation of the American form of government to the Filipinos, the Filipinos themselves are of unusually promising material. They possess admirable domestic and personal virtues, and though they are uncontrollable when such elemental passions as jealousy, revenge, or resentment are once aroused, most of them—practically all of the civilized inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas—

are naturally and normally peaceful, docile, and deferential to constituted authority. On the suppression of the insurrection the majority of them will be found to be good law-abiding citizens. Thirdly, though the majority of the inhabitants are uneducated, they evince a strong desire to be instructed, and the example of Japan is with them a cherished ideal of the value of modern education. A system of free schools for the people — another American institution, it will be noted — has been an important element in every Philippine program of reforms. Fourthly, the educated Filipinos, though constituting a minority, are far more numerous than is generally supposed, and are scattered all over the archipelago; and the Commission desires to bear the strongest testimony to the high range of their intelligence, and not only to their intellectual training, but also to their social refinement as well as to the grace and charm of their personal character. These educated Filipinos, in a word, are the equals of the men one meets in similar vocations — law, medicine, business, etc., — in Europe or America."

[NOTE. — The opportunities for higher education in the Philippines are given in the report, pages 38–41, as follows: A college founded in 1601, another between the years 1603 and 1610, a school of arts and trades, a school of agriculture, a nautical school, a school of painting and sculpture, a military academy, and six theological seminaries in different parts of the archipelago.]

4. OPINIONS OF HISTORIANS.

Mr. JOHN FOREMAN, Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, has been a resident for many years in the Philippines, and is the author of a much-quoted book on "The Philippine Islands." He also testified before the Treaty Commissioners at Paris. In the course of his testimony occurred the following Question and Answer: —

[SENATE DOCUMENT 62, PAGE 454.]

"Q. What do you say, from what you know, as to these natives being capable of self-government, if left to themselves? A. To speak briefly, I say 'No.' The native has no expansive ideas; he cannot go far enough to understand what it is to rule matters for the benefit of the common weal; he cannot get past his own most personal interest, or his town, at the most. I think the greatest length he would go would be his own town. But constructing laws, and obeying them, for the benefit of the commonwealth, I do not think he is

capable of it at all. I think an attempt at a native government would be a fiasco altogether."

[NOTE.—The events of the last two years may have modified Mr. Foreman's opinion of the Filipinos, for, in an article in the "National Review" for September, 1900, entitled "The United States and the Philippines," he recommends the following plan of government:—]

[PAGE 60.]

"The Governor-General should be authorized to inform the representative Filipinos that the United States policy is to gradually, but conditionally, relinquish control over the islands. A Philippine Chamber of Deputies, representing the large towns and districts, should hold its sessions in Manila, and vote laws for the internal government of the islands. The statutes of the Philippine Protectorate should be submitted to the United States Governor-General, or Commissioners appointed for the purpose, who would see that the rights of the foreigners are duly protected. For the reimbursement to the United States of the twenty millions gold dollars paid to Spain under the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Protectorate should issue to the United States 40,000 one thousand silver-dollar bonds, bearing interest at a rate to be agreed upon and payable half-yearly, the Philippine Protectorate undertaking to redeem annually a minimum of five per cent of the bonds, after the expiration of two years. The guarantee should be the customs dues collected by Philippine officials, but subject to an American control in Manila and the ports open to foreign trade. In normal years the customs dues amount to something over two millions of silver dollars, which would amply cover a four per cent interest on the working expenses of the customs service."

[*Summary of omitted part:* At the end of two years easy to raise more than net two millions of dollars per annum redemption money without increasing taxation existing prior to revolution. Details of above estimate.]

"The Military Governor and troops should be withdrawn within three or four months after the first payment of interest on the bonds, and America, as the protecting State, should be represented in Manila by a Resident and staff. The Resident could not interfere with the acts of the Chamber, but he would advise the Government and have the right of audience with all the members of the Cabinet. In the event of civil war, America should have the right to land troops to support the Government against the rebels. Beside the island of Guam, America would hold absolutely and in perpetuity any island of the Philippine group, except one of the eleven of primary importance and largest areas, to do whatever she liked with, except

alienate it to a foreign power. If she eventually relinquished it, it should revert to the Filipinos. This island would serve as a naval and military depot and a point *d'appui* for the furtherance of American interests in the Far East. Without a station of that kind the integrity of the Philippines, or America's own interests therein, could not be effectively protected. As a protected State, the Philippine Government could not make treaties with foreign Powers, or declare war."

FERDINAND BLUMENTRITT, member of the Berlin Society of Ethnology, is said by Prof. D. G. Brinton, the late prominent American ethnologist, to be "the greatest living scientific authority on the Philippines." On the strength of this and other similar endorsements the editors introduce the following extracts from Professor Blumentritt's pamphlet on "The Philippine Islands," translated by David J. Doherty, A. M., M. D., published by Donahue Brothers, Chicago.

[PAGE 31.]

"At all events, we have in the Filipino coast Malays, a highly-gifted and ambitious people, who deserve and will continue to deserve the sympathy of civilized Europeans. In number they run from six and a half to eight millions individuals, and some estimate them at still more. The Tagals constitute less than one third and more than one fourth, the Visayans nearly one half, the Ilocoans three tenths, and then come in descending series the Bikols, Panganisanes, Pangangos, Zambales, Kagayanes, Koyuvos, Kalamianes, and Agutainos."

[PAGE 50.]


"At their [the insurgents in 1896] head appeared Emilio Aguinaldo, a Tagal, who, because he was one of the admirers of Dr. Rizal, was searched after, but had escaped, and who, since then, by his great talent for organization and his statesmanlike gifts, has given to the world a shining example of the capability of the Philippine people."

[PAGE 61.]

"The excuse that they [the Filipinos] are not ripe for independence is not founded on facts. The Filipinos number more educated people than the kingdom of Servia and the principalities of Bulgaria and Montenegro. They have fewer illiterates than the states of the Balkan peninsula, Russia, many provinces of Spain and Portugal, and the Latin republics of America. There are provinces in which few people can be found who do not at least read. They pay more atten-

tion to education than Spain or the Balkan states do. There is no lack of trained men fit to govern their own country, and indeed in every branch, because under the Spanish rule the official business was entirely transacted by the native subalterns. The whole history of the Katipunan revolt and of the war against Spain and America serves to place in the best light the capability of the Filipinos for self-government. For, even in Polavieja's time, excesses occurred only exceptionally, and they were always punished. The history of the Philippine revolution is not stained with a long series of cruelties like those of the revolutions of the great civilized nations of Europe. That their tendency is toward European standards is evident from the respect which they showed to the lives and property of foreigners as well during the Katipunan revolt as since. The existence of a spirit of discipline and subordination and of respect for authority is shown by the morale of the Philippine army and its obedience to Aguinaldo's orders. Whoever is familiar with the history of the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies will remember how much discord there was among the rebels, and how they betrayed, deserted, and even in the presence of the enemy fought one another. But in the Filipino army all was harmonious just as in a loyal and well-disciplined European army.

"Therefore, no one can deny that the Filipinos have more right to form an independent government than many European and American countries."



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2. To circulate accurate information, by informal conversation, by inducing others to study the facts collected, and by sending to the Secretary the names of people who may be thought to be interested.

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